High Time for Confronting North Korea
The following op-ed appeared in RealClearPolitics (original link here).
March 25, 2005
High Time for Confronting North Korea
By James J. Na
During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip through Asia last week, the North Korean nuclear threat was the major topic of discussion, particularly in Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. In the months preceding the trip, North Korea had raised the stakes in the increasingly tense standoff by officially declaring that it indeed possessed nuclear weapons. In response, Rice put forth the idea of a sanction against North Korea during her rounds through Asian capitals.
The possibility of an international sanction, perhaps even a complete quarantine, of North Korea is an idea whose time has come, the threat of which may be essential for breaking the deadlock.
Despite much talk about a "carrot and stick" approach to North Korea, the discussion among the six powers (North and South Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia) has centered on a "carrot-only" policy. In particular, China has pushed the idea of the US providing economic aid and security guarantees first in return for North Korea's subsequent suspension of its nuclear weapons program.
The Bush administration has rebuffed the idea, as accepting it would amount to nothing more than succumbing to a nuclear blackmail. Since verification of North Korea's adherence to such a compromise would be neither complete nor irreversible, a "carrot-only" agreement would likely lead to future North Korean provocations to extort more benefits, which is essentially what occurred subsequent to the Clinton administration's futile 1994 accord with Pyongyang.
Indeed, what is necessary to break the standoff is a "carrot or stick" policy. While national governments can be influenced with offers of incentives, they rarely sacrifice their core interests for future benefits. Tyrannical governments, in particular, respond more readily to prospects of costs to themselves. A policy incorporating both aspects would be even more effective.
North Korea's increasingly desperate regime reputedly views nuclear weapons, not merely as tools of economic extortion, but more importantly as a security guarantee of its continued existence. Having witnessed the overwhelming superiority of American military forces in Iraq twice, North Korean leaders clearly understand that their vast but obsolete conventional forces are no longer a guarantee of their survival. Hence North Korea's regime will never give up its nuclear weapons unless the international situation were such that the possession of the weapons is made a greater threat to the regime's survival than its disarmament.
The Bush administration officials stated repeatedly that time is not on our side. This is true to the extent the continuing deadlock gives more time for North Korea to develop, disperse and harden the weapons. Thus, the status quo is clearly unacceptable. At the same time, military options are both severely limited and highly risky.
Hence the range of options for a "stick" is rather narrow. However, an international sanction and -- even better -- a complete quarantine of North Korea offer a strategy that is both less aggressive and risky than outright military action but also more likely to be efficacious than the status quo. Furthermore, a regional quarantine would not require the participation of American ground forces that are tied in the Middle East. Uncommitted air and naval assets would suffice.
Presenting North Korea with a "carrot or stick," i.e. telling North Korea to either accept economic aid and security guarantee in return for a highly intrusive "complete, irreversible and verifiable" disarmament or face a serious consequence of a quarantine, would not been seen in the region as capitulating to nuclear blackmail as in a "carrot-only" policy.
Why would North Korea accept such an ultimatum? Because rejection would mean not only loss of proposed benefits, but also increased stress on the viability of its regime. North Korea barely survives on subsidized oil and food from China and humanitarian aid from Japan and South Korea. North Korean leaders reputedly consider at least two-thirds of their citizens to be either hostile or apathetic to the survival of the regime, a number that is no doubt on the rise. A quarantine that cuts off remaining lifeline of energy and food would add intolerable pressure, making the regime's survival enormously difficult.
The tricky part of the "carrot or stick" strategy is obtaining cooperation of the other regional powers. Japan's steadfast cooperation is largely assured, not least because it faces a growing and immediate danger to its own safety from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Putin's Russia, which shares a short land border with North Korea, is in a difficult mood since the Ukrainian election, going so far as to continue nuclear cooperation with Iran, but also has less at stake in the region.
South Korea -- supposedly a strong ally -- with its left-of-center government has been superficially friendly, but substantively uncooperative to the United States. It may require a judicious threat to completely withdraw US forces from South Korea to achieve better cooperation.
China's help is both vital and hard to obtain. While it is not in China's interest to have an unstable nuclear North Korea on its border, especially now that its relationship with South Korea is both economically important and friendly, China stands to gain from the US by leveraging its influence on North Korea. To achieve a nuclear weapon-free North Korea, it may become necessary to pay the proverbial "pound of flesh" -- both on Taiwan's independence and Japan's security role in Asia -- to gain China's full assistance.
The Bush administration is in a position to achieve nuclear disarmament of North Korea, provided that it is willing to suffer the costs of assembling a regional coalition and to confront North Korea with an ultimatum of "carrot or stick." Whether the administration is willing to engage in such a strategy or not, what it must strenuously avoid is a repeat of what the Clinton administration did -- to pass down a major international threat that will be substantially more difficult to resolve for its successor.
March 25, 2005
High Time for Confronting North Korea
By James J. Na
During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip through Asia last week, the North Korean nuclear threat was the major topic of discussion, particularly in Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo. In the months preceding the trip, North Korea had raised the stakes in the increasingly tense standoff by officially declaring that it indeed possessed nuclear weapons. In response, Rice put forth the idea of a sanction against North Korea during her rounds through Asian capitals.
The possibility of an international sanction, perhaps even a complete quarantine, of North Korea is an idea whose time has come, the threat of which may be essential for breaking the deadlock.
Despite much talk about a "carrot and stick" approach to North Korea, the discussion among the six powers (North and South Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia) has centered on a "carrot-only" policy. In particular, China has pushed the idea of the US providing economic aid and security guarantees first in return for North Korea's subsequent suspension of its nuclear weapons program.
The Bush administration has rebuffed the idea, as accepting it would amount to nothing more than succumbing to a nuclear blackmail. Since verification of North Korea's adherence to such a compromise would be neither complete nor irreversible, a "carrot-only" agreement would likely lead to future North Korean provocations to extort more benefits, which is essentially what occurred subsequent to the Clinton administration's futile 1994 accord with Pyongyang.
Indeed, what is necessary to break the standoff is a "carrot or stick" policy. While national governments can be influenced with offers of incentives, they rarely sacrifice their core interests for future benefits. Tyrannical governments, in particular, respond more readily to prospects of costs to themselves. A policy incorporating both aspects would be even more effective.
North Korea's increasingly desperate regime reputedly views nuclear weapons, not merely as tools of economic extortion, but more importantly as a security guarantee of its continued existence. Having witnessed the overwhelming superiority of American military forces in Iraq twice, North Korean leaders clearly understand that their vast but obsolete conventional forces are no longer a guarantee of their survival. Hence North Korea's regime will never give up its nuclear weapons unless the international situation were such that the possession of the weapons is made a greater threat to the regime's survival than its disarmament.
The Bush administration officials stated repeatedly that time is not on our side. This is true to the extent the continuing deadlock gives more time for North Korea to develop, disperse and harden the weapons. Thus, the status quo is clearly unacceptable. At the same time, military options are both severely limited and highly risky.
Hence the range of options for a "stick" is rather narrow. However, an international sanction and -- even better -- a complete quarantine of North Korea offer a strategy that is both less aggressive and risky than outright military action but also more likely to be efficacious than the status quo. Furthermore, a regional quarantine would not require the participation of American ground forces that are tied in the Middle East. Uncommitted air and naval assets would suffice.
Presenting North Korea with a "carrot or stick," i.e. telling North Korea to either accept economic aid and security guarantee in return for a highly intrusive "complete, irreversible and verifiable" disarmament or face a serious consequence of a quarantine, would not been seen in the region as capitulating to nuclear blackmail as in a "carrot-only" policy.
Why would North Korea accept such an ultimatum? Because rejection would mean not only loss of proposed benefits, but also increased stress on the viability of its regime. North Korea barely survives on subsidized oil and food from China and humanitarian aid from Japan and South Korea. North Korean leaders reputedly consider at least two-thirds of their citizens to be either hostile or apathetic to the survival of the regime, a number that is no doubt on the rise. A quarantine that cuts off remaining lifeline of energy and food would add intolerable pressure, making the regime's survival enormously difficult.
The tricky part of the "carrot or stick" strategy is obtaining cooperation of the other regional powers. Japan's steadfast cooperation is largely assured, not least because it faces a growing and immediate danger to its own safety from North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Putin's Russia, which shares a short land border with North Korea, is in a difficult mood since the Ukrainian election, going so far as to continue nuclear cooperation with Iran, but also has less at stake in the region.
South Korea -- supposedly a strong ally -- with its left-of-center government has been superficially friendly, but substantively uncooperative to the United States. It may require a judicious threat to completely withdraw US forces from South Korea to achieve better cooperation.
China's help is both vital and hard to obtain. While it is not in China's interest to have an unstable nuclear North Korea on its border, especially now that its relationship with South Korea is both economically important and friendly, China stands to gain from the US by leveraging its influence on North Korea. To achieve a nuclear weapon-free North Korea, it may become necessary to pay the proverbial "pound of flesh" -- both on Taiwan's independence and Japan's security role in Asia -- to gain China's full assistance.
The Bush administration is in a position to achieve nuclear disarmament of North Korea, provided that it is willing to suffer the costs of assembling a regional coalition and to confront North Korea with an ultimatum of "carrot or stick." Whether the administration is willing to engage in such a strategy or not, what it must strenuously avoid is a repeat of what the Clinton administration did -- to pass down a major international threat that will be substantially more difficult to resolve for its successor.
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The situation we face with regard to North Korea, or for that matter Iran, does not seem to me to be significantly different from the dilemma we faced before the fall of Saddam: That is, given the nature of these regimes, there is no system of inspections that can be trusted to provide the assurances we seek. The regimes are the problem, not the inspections.
If we have any way to contribute to the destabilization of these regimes, we should employ them now. The most likely vulnerability in Iran is the possibility that the democratic revolutions in the Middle East may spread there as well. Perhaps we can assist that in some way. In the case of North Korea, the most likely weakness is the possibility that the regime may implode economically. Perhaps we can hasten that in some way.
But, frankly, I think both possibilities are long shots. Most likely, both Iran and North Korea cannot be stopped from developing nuclear weapons. The most plausible fall-back strategy I have seen so far is the one proposed by LTC Joseph C. Myers: Reinstitute the doctrine of massive retaliation. Make it clear that any nuclear attack on the U.S. will provoke a nuclear response against our known enemies.
Posted by
Tom Rekdal |
25/3/05 12:52
Mr. Rekdal:
The doctrine of massive retalitation is, frankly put, dead.
Let's assume the worst and say that there is detonation of a nuclear bomb in an American city.
Are we going to nuke Iran, Syria, China, Pakistan, North Korea and so on?
It is entirely possible, and even probable, that anyone of the rogue nuclear powers can provide a bomb to a terrorist group with sufficient ambiguity to make any "massive" retaliation sufficiently impractical and politically impossible.
I am no hand-holding multilateralist, but there are limits to going without friends. To carry out such a doctrine would cost us what allies we have. We would truly be isolated, with far reaching long-term consequences beyond having to deal with a bombed out city.
Posted by
James J. Na |
27/3/05 17:21
Ironically, your argument against "massive" retaliation is exactly the argument that was used against the doctrine during the Cold War. Would the U.S. really have responded to a Soviet invasion of Europe with nuclear weapons? Many in Europe thought we would not. Many in the U.S. argued that we should not. But there was just enough uncertainty in the Politbureau to make deterrence work.
In the MAD logic of nuclear deterrence both sides were "rational." It may be doubted whether Bin Laden or Al-Zarqawi are "rational" in the same sense (though that is not clear), but the rulers of Iran and North Korea certainly are, and it is their actions we need to deter.
The prospect of being held accountable for a nuclear terrorist event in the U.S. will pit our enemies against each other. Libya is a case in point.
This strikes me as more workable than an inspections regime that will only comfort the gullible.
Posted by
Tom Rekdal |
28/3/05 14:32
Mr. Rekdal:
MAD has a greater chance of working where there are 1) bipolarity and 2) clearly identifiable sponsor of attack.
Both conditions were present vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, particularly during the early part of the Cold War. Your analogy of deterring a Soviet invasion of Central Europe fits well there.
Using another analogy, would "massive deterrence" against Soviet Union (or Red China) have worked for assisting North Vietnam sponsor an insurgency in South Vietnam?
Let's fast forward to tomorrow. Suppose there is detonation of a nuclear attack in an American city.
We suspect North Korea, but evidence is unclear. Iran, instead, could be responsible.
Where do we direct our "massive retaliation"? Both? Are we going to hold Iran responsible for what North Korea does and/or vice versa?
How could such a strategy work rationally? How would it be accepted by not only our enemies but by our allies?
Furthermore, would such a strategy prevent an attack on the US or would it merely push a terrorist group to exert a greater effort to mask the origin of the attack?
Posted by
James J. Na |
28/3/05 21:44
Let me start with the easier question first. Does the failure of the threat of "massive" retaliation to deter Soviet, Chinese, or North Vietnamese support of the insurgency in South Vietnam demonstrate the inutility of the doctrine? No, our abandonment of the latter shows that their independence was not the kind of national interest warranting the highest level of risk.
The other questions you raise are more difficult, but they are not unique to my position. You would have to face them as well if an inspections regime fails and we suffer a nuclear attack.
I am looking at the problem ex-ante (what is our best deterrence of an attack?) and you are looking at it ex-post (what should we do if the threat fails?). I think the threat of nuclear retaliation will (a) make the transfer of weapons to terrorists less likely and (b) make the frustration of such transfers by other powers more likely.
But admittedly the threat may fail, just as your inspections may fail, and we are attacked. What should we do then?
To start with, we should free ourselves from the mentality that this is a crime that must be solved, and that nothing can be done until those directly responsible are identified beyond reasonable doubt. There is a war to be won, not a crime to be solved, and our immediate targets should be those the present the greatest danger to us at the moment. (Much like what we have done in Iraq.)
Posted by
Tom Rekdal |
29/3/05 11:23
Indeed, as wisely noted above, there is nothing obsolete about the principles involved in decisively defeating any enemy (or any axis of them). The critical factors are:
* The will to win
* An effective understanding of how to use which weapons where [e.g. visions that fear mongering disarmament advocates have of "global destruction" and "nuclear carpet bombing" are laughable].
* Long term preparation of infrastructure, military, citizenry and C4I for the expected impacts of great war
* Understanding of and planning for the expected sacrifices in pursuit of victory
Certainly, a dedicated and skilled war planner can come up with a war winning plan - including worst case plans to win the stochastically inevitable next war between great powers. That having been written, I fear that long years of utopian programming and discrediting operations against Von Clausewitz have had their toll on most people in the West. It is actually the ascendent great powers of the East who are more likely to adopt the proper attitude and dispassionate planning needed to win the next Great War.
To fellow Westerners, I leave you with the following: If you want to survive, the strategy is not one of attempting to maintain peace - via treaties, arms aggreements or the UN. All of these WILL fail - as history has so many times revealed. If you want to survive, you must assume that your opponents are planning to conquer you, using any and all means available to them. When the inevitable occurs, they will use "unthinkable" munitions, in accordance with highly disciplined plans. The appropriate tools will be used for each job. To destroy silos and bunkers, massive nuclear explosions. To blow up airplanes, sabotage done by special ops troops. Some areas will not even know there is a nuclear war - others will be turned into glass. It can be psychologically difficult to plan for the coming great war(s). And they who do, will win.
Posted by
stevesadlov |
19/5/05 17:09